theoretical principles underlying those doctrines, and the narrow range of recognized exceptions to constitutional protection for speech that might, in some circumstances, permit hate speech to be punished.
The second stage of the analysis examines the relationship of these first amendment doctrines to notions of academic freedom at both state and private universities. Do the free speech rules prevailing in the general marketplace apply with equal force on university campuses? Or are there first amendment principles that either require or permit a different response to hate speech on campus than current first amendment doctrines allow in other contexts? 3 
II HATE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Contrasting "Affirmative" and "Negative" First Amendment Jurisprudence l. The "Affirmative" Side of Free Speech. The "affirmative" side of first amendment jurisprudence approaches free speech issues by emphasizing a group of interrelated doctrines that have combined, in modern times, to create a constitutional jurisprudence highly protective of freedom of speech. 4 The affirmative side begins with the mindset that speech is presumptively protected against any restraint or punishment, and regards any encroachment with intense skepticism. The issues in this debate are complicated, and their resolution will be influenced by, among other factors, whether the university in question is public or private. See Univt!T'sity of Pennsylvania, 110 S Ct at 587 n6 (suggesting that attempts by government to control the content of speech on private universities involve a different constitutional balance than regulation on public campuses, where government has interests both as a speaker and as the regulator). This article does not attempt to join issue on this generic question, but rather is limited to the specific legal and policy conflicts posed by hate speech. On a state university campus, regulation of hate speech is constrained directly by the first amendment. Since government is also in some contexts a "speaker" at a state university campus (as when a faculty member is speaking for the university), striking the appropriate first amendment balance is often complex. See notes 112-19 and accompanying text. A private university, of course, is not legally bound by the first amendment. When discussing the rules governing hate speech that a private university sets for itself, therefore, no issues of constitutional law are formally implicated. While not of first amendment dimension, the policy conflicts posed by hate speech regulations at private universities are, however, no different than those at public institutions. This article thus proceeds on the premise that the resolution of those conflicts pressed here are of equal validity for both public and private universities. See The affirmative first amendment thinker is constantly looking for ways to stretch existing doctrines to embrace wider and wider protection for speech. Affirmative thinkers are unlikely to rest the justification for freedom of speech on any one theory, but instead point to a cluster of rationales for treating freedom of speech as a specially preferred social value. 5 Most importantly, the affirmative side of first amendment jurisprudence emphasizes both the social value of free speech to the collective good and the private value of free speech to the individual. 6 As a collective value, freedom of speech serves the general social interest in the pursuit of truth through the "marketplace of ideas. " 7 Free speech also serves as a check on tyranny, 8 and is the lifeblood of democratic selfgovernance.9 These collective theories justify free speech as a means to an end. But free speech is also an end in itself, an end intimately intertwined with human autonomy and dignity .
10 Free speech is thus especially valuable for reasons that have nothing to do with the collective search for truth or the processes of self-government, or for any other conceptualization of the common good. 11 It is a right to speak one's mind defiantly, robustly, and irreverently, just because it is one's mind.' 2 2. The "Negative" Side of Free Speech. The "negative" side approaches the first amendment as a problem to be got around whenever it interferes with 12. Rodney A. Smolla, Suing the Press: Libel, the Media, and Power 257 (Oxford Univ Press, 1986). Even when the speaker has no realistic hope that the audience will be persuaded to his or her viewpoint, even when no plausible case can be made that the search for truth will be advanced, freedom to speak without restraint provides the speaker with an inner satisfaction and realization of self-identity essential to individual fulfillment. [Vol. 53: No.3 constructive social policy goals. The negative side begins with the proposition that the first amendment is not an absolute and that many recognized doctrines exist that permit speech to be regulated or punished.
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When presented with a problem such as hate speech, the negative first amendment thinker says: "Here are social policy values of enormous magnitude-equality, tolerance, and respect for human dignity-values that are, no less than free speech, of constitutional dimension. Let us employ every conceivable exception to protection for free expression that is currently recognized, so that hate speech can be deterred and these laudable values vindicated."
The negative first amendment thinker accepts freedom of speech as an important constitutional value, but, when matters such as hate speech are at issue, tends to look for ways to stretch the loopholes. The negative thinker will tend to punch holes in the many classic rationales that have been advanced to support expansive protection of freedom of speech. The poetic power of the marketplace image, it is pointed out, is tempered by experience.l 4 Grounding freedom of speech in individual fulfillment, it is argued, is inappropriate, for then freedom of speech becomes indistinguishable from any other human desire, losing any claim to unique 13. See generally Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale LJ 1105 (1979). 14. When subjected to severe cross-examination, no single justification for freedom of speech is likely to come through perfectly unscathed, and the marketplace rationale is no exception.
The marketplace of ideas is a marketplace, and like all markets, it may experience positive and negative cycles. The marketplace image is grounded in laissez-faire economic theory. Even if we are to accept the apparent lesson of perestroika that, on the whole, free economic markets perform more efficiently than controlled economies, almost all governments utilize some controls on markets to correct for excesses and imperfections that can lead to violent economic swings. The theoretical purity of the models in economic textbooks is not matched by the actual performance of markets in the mundane commercial world.
Economists concede the necessity of using governmental regulation to trim the freedom of markets at the edges, correcting their deficiencies in the real world of commerce. See The marketplace of ideas rationale is also ostensibly contradicted by our everyday experience. There are as many shoddy ideas circulating as there are shoddy products. If the marketplace produces truth, the persistence of falsity seems difficult to explain. Is there any reason to be confident that good thoughts drive out bad ones? Nazis and the Ku Klux Klan continue to parade in America, and racial separatism continues as the formal law of South Africa. The belief in racial and ethnic superiority is still in wide currency throughout the world, from ethnic strife in the Soviet republics to the tense racial politics of New York City and Washington, D.C. Institutions and individuals across the globe continue to espouse and practice the dominance and exploitation of women. See generally Wellington, 88 Yale LJ at 1130-32 (cited in note 13).
The hope that the marketplace will lead to truth is further eroded by the infiltration of emotional distortions into the realm of "ideas." Irrational appeals to hate and prejudice have, throughout the experience of man, often overwhelmed thoughtful tolerance and understanding, leading to violence and destruction. Even if we were to accept the marketplace of ideas model as valid, therefore, it would remain to be decided what would count as an "idea." Would it necessarily encompass appeals to hate that shortcut the mind and speak from heart to heart, or could it be limited to speech asserting intellectual propositions? See notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
Finally, there is a curiously ironic shortcoming to the marketplace image. We can never empirically test the proposition that truth will triumph over error, because that would itself require some shelter from interference by the state.
15
Significantly, the negative free speech thinker is likely to single out one narrow rationale for elevating protection of free expression-the significance of freedom of speech to the process of self-governance-thus treating political speech as the only genre of expression meriting heightened protection. 16 3. Free Speech Theory in the Supreme Court. In the last three decades, the affirmative side of free speech thinking has generally triumphed over the negative. The Supreme Court has tended to accept the affirmative argument that freedom of speech is a preferred value supported by multiple rationales, extending generous levels of constitutional protection to a vast range of expression. Despite the marketplace metaphor's frailties, the Court has enthusiastically embraced it. 17 The Court has declined the invitation to limit first amendment protection to political speech. While recognizing in many cases that political speech lies at the core of the first amendment, 18 it has nevertheless insisted that the "guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government."
19 The Court has declared that the free speech and free press guarantees "are not confined to any field of human interest, " 20 and that "it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced . . . pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters
Most significantly, the Court has acknowledged that the first amendment "serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit-a spirit that demands self-expression." 22 15. The self-fulfillment rationale has an almost unseemly ring of hedonism. Speakers claim protection for the sheer pleasure of speaking. The objection might thus be made that to ground freedom of speech in the self-fulfillment theory is to indulge the individual in a right of selfgratification that legal systems have traditionally not been obliged to respect. An individual may derive pleasure and fulfillment from many activities other than speech, and so the pleasure principle seems insufficient by itself to justify atypical rules for speech. Individuals may also seek pleasure or fulfillment by taking cocaine or having sex with a prostitute, but those two activities have not, traditionally, been deemed outside the legitimate regulation of the state. Many nonspeech activities through which individuals seek pleasure have conventionally been deemed by society as either illicit or illegal or both, even when they involve no immediate victims, on the theory that they may tend to cause harm. If protection of speech is linked to the pursuit of pleasure, then the state should be permitted to regulate speech in the same manner as it regulates other pleasure-seeking activity. See There are a number of modem affirmative first amendment doctrines that interlock to create a large measure of protection for hate speech.
1. Neutrality. The neutrality principle embraces a cluster of precepts that form the core of modem first amendment jurisprudence. Mere opposition to an idea is never enough, standing alone, to justify the abridgment of speech. 23 Government may not pick and choose among ideas, but must always be "viewpoint neutral. " 24 All ideas are created equal in the eyes of the first amendment-even those ideas that are universally condemned and run attack on the underlying premise that government may control most activities of human life if it can simply point to reasonable grounds for doing so. A libertarian would argue that the presumption should be exactly the opposite: government normally may not intervene in an individual's affairs, and is justified in doing so only to the extent necessary to prevent the individual from harming others. This means that many pleasure·seeking activities are beyond the legitimate jurisdiction of the state altogether, because they harm only the individual who engages in them. The "harm requirement" may not be satisfied merely by the outrage or moral opprobrium that the majority attaches to the activity. Crimes must have victims-victims other than the perpetrator. In a society organized under strict libertarian principles, free speech receives protection far higher than unweighted balancing for the same reasons that many other forms of activity are protected: because government is often unable to point to palpable harm caused by the activity. One need not adopt the complete libertarian argument, however, to defeat the position that self-fulfillment is mere selfgratification, and thus an insufficient basis for special protection for speech. A second, more modest argument treats the self-fulfillment aspect of speech as qualitatively different from other forms of gratification, and therefore critically important even if one is not a card-carrying libertarian. A persuasive case can be made that speech is a form of self-gratification different in kind from most other forms of self-fulfillment, and therefore deserving of special solicitude. We may start by quibbling on terms. To articulate the theory in terms of "pleasure" and "gratification" is to trivialize it. The term "self-fulfillment" connotes much more than hedonistic pleasure and gratification. The words "pleasure" and "gratification" emphasize those aspects of human life that resemble the lives of animals; the term "self-fulfillment" emphasizes those aspects of humanity that distinguish human beings from other species. The fulfillment that comes from speech is bonded to the human capacity to think, imagine, and create. Conscience and consciousness are the sacred precincts of mind and soul. Several points in Cohen merit special emphasis. First, the Court unequivocally rejected the notion that a state may seek to prevent the use of vulgarity merely for the purpose of cleansing public discourse and sheltering citizens from offensive language:
How is one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm the judgment below. For, while the particular fourletter word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is nevertheless true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric. Id at 25.
Second, the Court made it clear that the shock value of Cohen's language did not justify the California law. The Court rejected the assertion that the state could excise "one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse, either upon the theory ... that its use is inherently likely to cause violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that the States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary.'' Id at 22-23.
Finally, the Court held that it made no difference that some members of the general public would inadvertently be exposed to Cohen's vulgarity. Id at 22. The Cohen decision, it must be remembered, involved the quintessential example of lewd or profane language-indeed, the single most offensive word in the American vocabulary. Further, the case arose inside a courthouse, a setting in which the state traditionally has substantially more right to regulate speech than it has in the public streets.
28. In Hustler, 485 US 46, the Court was faced with a crude parody run by Hustler Magazine depicting Reverend Jerry Falwell as an incestuous drunk. The Court ruled without dissent that the parody was protected under the first amendment. Chief justice Rehnquist conceded that the Hustler parody was at best a distant cousin of the conventional political cartoon, "and a rather poor relation at that." Id at 55. Rehnquist argued, however, that there was simply no way to draw a principled distinction between the Hustler parody and other satiric efforts. "If it were possible," he stated, "by laying down a principled standard to separate the one from the other, public discourse would [VoL 53: No. 3 3. The Symbolism Principle. First amendment protection is not limited to the use of language, but also includes expressive conduct, such as mass demonstrations or communication through the use of symbols. 29 4. The Harm Principle. While the neutrality principle forbids penalizing speech merely because of opposition to its content, modern first amendment jurisprudence does permit speech to be penalized when it causes harm. The harm principle defines the types of injuries that will qualify as harms sufficient to justify regulation of speech. 30 The harm principle is a natural corollary to probably suffer little or no harm." I d. But the Supreme Court was doubtful, Rehnquist explained, that any reasonably concrete standard could ever be articulated. Amorphous pejoratives such as "outrageous" or "indecent" were too subjective to withstand first amendment requirements. To permit a jury to impose liability for mere "outrageousness" would invite jurors to base liability on the basis of their tastes and prejudices. the neutrality and emotion principles, serving to preserve the integrity of those two doctrines.
The possible harms caused by speech may be divided into three categories: physical harms, relational harms, and reactive harms.
(a) Physical Harms. Speech may cause physical harms to persons or property in a variety of ways. Speech may be used to negotiate a contract soliciting a murder, or to commission an arsonist to burn down a building. Speech may be used to whip an angry crowd of protesters into an emotional frenzy, inciting them to storm barricades and throw rocks at police. The physical violence caused by these examples carries out the wishes of the speaker. Speech may also cause violence counter to the speaker's interests, as when those who hear the message are so outraged that they are moved to physical assault against the speaker. Though the harms resulting from speech are often limited to only one category, the three categories above are not mutually exclusive. The harms may be a blend of more than one of the categories, and any given act of speech may simultaneously result in all three categories of harms. For example, a speaker might utter a slanderous remark to someone in a face-toface confrontation that leads to fisticuffs between the speaker and his victim. The remark might in turn be heard by others with whom the victim has social or business relationships, thus interfering with those relationships. Finally, the remark might cause the victim and others in the community to experience powerful feelings of disgust and revulsion. 31 The three categories represent a hierarchy of governmental justifications for regulating speech. Government has the strongest case for regulating speech posing risks of physical harms. Government's justifications for regulating speech posing risks of relational harms are quite strong, though not as forceful as for physical harms.
The harms posed in Category III may not be used as justifications for regulation of speech. This rule simply restates the neutrality and emotion principles: neither intellectual nor emotional revulsion to speech is ever enough, standing alone, to justify its abridgment-government must instead demonstrate an invasion of one of the more palpable physical or relational harms listed in Categories I or II.
The Causation Principle.
The integrity of the neutrality, emotion, and harm principles is dependent upon the adoption of a rigorous causation rule that requires a close causal nexus between speech and harm before penalizing speech. The modern "clear and present danger" test is the most famous articulation of the currently prevailing causation rule. In its current form, the test provides that advocacy of force or criminal activity may not be enough unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 32 Without a strict causation test, government will tend to slip surreptitiously into penalizing opinions, and into permitting regulation of speech purely because of the 31. Alternatively. any given act of communication might be relatively pure, implicating only one type of harm. For example, a speaker might copy verbatim from someone else's copyrighted work and sell the copies for profit, without permission from the copyright owner. This could interfere with a relational ownership interest, but not pose any risk of physical harm or cause any negative emotional or intellectual reaction in persons exposed to the speech. (The owner of the copyright might, of course, be emotionally upset that someone has pirated his or her work-but that emotional disturbance is not in reaction to the actual message but rather to the theft of his or her intellectual property.) 32. Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444, 447 (1969). Brandenburg involved a Ku Klux Klan rally conducted on a farm in Hamilton County, Ohio, outside Cincinnati. A local Cincinnati television station reporter had been invited to witness the rally, and he and a cameraman filmed the event, portions of which were later broadcast on the Cincinnati station and a national network. Id at 445. The film footage is filled with vile, incendiary racist bile. Klan members pronounced that "the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel," and "if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." ld at 446-47.
The state of Ohio prosecuted Brandenburg, the leader of the Klan group, under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law, which made it illegal to advocate "the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," or to assemble "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id at 444-45, quoting Ohio Rev Code Ann reactive disturbances it causes. Virtually any opmton might, at some indeterminate future time, "cause" physical harm. 33 Similarly, the emotional and intellectual reactions of others to speech might ripen into violent physical reactions at some indeterminate future time. A society will never have robust freedom of speech if any threat of future physical harm is enough to justify speech regulation.
6. The Precision Principle. Precision is a pervasive theme of modern first amendment analysis. Even when regulation of speech is otherwise justified (as when a compelling governmental interest is at stake), the regulation will be struck down if it fails to meet both substantive and definitional precision requirements. A substantive principle requires that regulatory mechanisms implicating speech be precisely designed to effectuate the governmental interest at stake. 34 A parallel rule of definitional precision requires that the § 2923.13 (repealed 1974). Brandenburg was convicted, fined $1,000, and sentenced to one to ten years' imprisonment. ld at 445.
The Court held the Ohio law unconstitutional. Id at 448. No one was present at the Klan rally except the Klan members themselves, the television reporter, and his cameraman. Id at 445-46. Nothing in the record indicated that the orgy of race hate posed any immediate physical threat to anyone, and the statute, either as written or applied in this case, does nothing to distinguish "mere advocacy" from "incitement to imminent lawless action." Id at 448-49. In these circumstances, the Court said, the Klan was guilty only of the "abstract teaching" of the "moral propriety" of racist violence. Id at 448, quoting Nolo v United States, 367 US 290, 297-98 (1961). " [T] he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press," according to the Court, "do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Id at 447.
33. In Hess v Indiana, 414 US 105 (1973), the defendant Gregory Hess was convicted of violating Indiana's disorderly conduct statute in an anti-Vietnam War demonstration on the campus oflndiana University. Between lOb and 150 demonstrators had moved onto a public street, blocking traffic.
After refusing to obey the sheriff's command to clear the street, the demonstrators were moved to the curbs by the sheriff and his deputies. Id at 106. As the sheriff passed by Hess, Hess said, "We'll take the fucking street later." The sheriff immediately arrested Hess for disorderly conduct, and he was convicted. Id at 107.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that Hess could not be convicted merely for having used the word "fuck," since that word standing alone did not satisfy the legal definition of obscenity. I d. Nor could Hess's statement be seen as a direct verbal challenge to fight the sheriff or his deputies-witnesses testified that he was facing the crowd, not the street, when he made the statement and that his words did not appear to be addressed to any particular person or group. Id at 107-08. Turning to the Brandenburg standard, the Court held that Hess was not guilty of any incitement to imminent lawless action. Id at 108-09. The words "We'll take the fucking street later," the Court maintained, could be taken as a counsel for "present moderation" or as advocacy of illegal action "at some indefinite future time," neither of which were enough to constitute a present threat of imminent disorder. Id at 108.
34. This substantive precision principle is a component of both the "strict scrutiny" level of judicial review applicable to content-based regulation of speech and the reduced level of scrutiny applicable to non-content-based regulation. See, for example, Sable Communications of California, Inc. v FCC, I 09 S Ct 2829, 2836 (1989) (government may only "regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest"); 0 'Brien, 391 US at 377 (When government regulation is "unrelated to the suppression of free expression," the "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms" must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."). See also Board ofTmstees of State University of New l'ork v Fox, 109 S Ct 3028, 3035 (1989)(requiring a "reasonable" fit between means and ends in commercial speech cases). These substantive first amendment standards are discussed in greater detail in notes 54-58 and accompanying text. terms used to identify proscribed speech be defined with a meticulous exactitude well beyond that of other routine legislation, so that speakers know in advance what speech is and is not permitted, thereby avoiding the selfcensorship caused by uncertainty. 35 C. Hate Speech and the Negative Side of the First Amendment Modern first amendment jurisprudence does permit expression to be penalized in a number of circumstances arguably applicable to hate speech.
1. The Two-Class Theory. Back in an older and simpler time in the history of free expression, the Supreme Court appeared to espouse a theory that treated certain types of expression as taboo forms of speech, beneath the dignity of the first amendment. 36 The most celebrated statement of this view appeared in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire: 3 7 There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 38 Hate speech is clearly within the Chaplinsky litany. In common sense understanding a vulgar racial slur may variously be described as "lewd," "obscene," "profane," "libelous," or "insulting," and thus the very type of expression "the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." And indeed, in 1952, when this two-class theory of the first amendment was still flourishing, the Court upheld a criminal conviction for spreading racist hate speech. In Beauhamais v. Illinois, 39 the Court was faced with a criminal libel case involving an Illinois statute that criminalized any publication portraying "depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion" exposing them "to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots. " 40 The defendant Beauharnais was president of a racist Chicago organization, the White Circle League, which had distributed racist leaflets. 41 35. The first amendment thus imposes meticulous tolerance levels on the "engineering" utilized in speech laws. This is reflected in rules such as the "overbreadth" and "vagueness" doctrines. In his defense to the Illinois criminal prosecution, Beauharnais asked that the jury be instructed that he could not be found guilty unless the leaflets were "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest."
42 The Illinois court refused to use this instruction, and Beauharnais was convicted. 43 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by Justice Felix Frankfurter. 44 If such a two-class theory of the first amendment still survived, hate speech could be punished with impunity. But the theory is no longer viable; modern first amendment principles have passed it by, 45 and Beauhamais is no longer good law. The Court no longer accepts the view that speech may be proscribed merely because it is "lewd," "profane," or otherwise vulgar or offensive-the decisions in cases such as Cohen 46 and Hustler 47 are illustrative-and libelous speech is no longer beyond first amendment protection.
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Only one small piece of the two-class theory survives: the Court continues to treat "obscene" speech as not within the protection of the first amendment at all. 44. Justice Frankfurter's opinion contained only a short-but interesting-discussion of freedom of speech. It had been argued against the Illinois law that prohibiting libel of a creed or a racial group is "but a step from prohibiting libel of a political party." 343 US at 263. Frankfurter clearly thought, however, that a sharp first amendment distinction existed between restrictions on political speech and restrictions relating to "race, color, creed or religion." Id at 263 nl8. These terms, he insisted, had "attained too fixed a meaning to permit political groups to be brought within" their rubric, and for Frankfurter that rubric was apparently outside the protections of the first amendment. Id. "Of course," he noted, "discussion cannot be denied and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must not be stifled." Id at 264. But for Frankfurter there was nothing "political" about this speech, nor did it rise to the level of "discussion." "If a statute sought to outlaw libels of political parties," he conceded, "quite different problems not now before us would be raised." Id at 263 n 18. Frankfurter was confident that "[ w ]hile this Court sits, it retains and exercises authority to nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance under the guise of punishing libel." Id at 263-64 (citation omitted physical reaction may be penalized. 50 A statute aimed at hate speech that only penalizes such "fighting words" confrontations, and that is applied to require a governmental showing of imminent danger in every individual case, would be constitutionaJ.5 1 Such a statute or regulation might also be symbolically valuable, for it at least makes some statement concerning human dignity and the repugnance of society for hate speech attacks. A mere fighting words statute, however, will reach only a small percentage of hate speech. 5 2 3. Content-Neutral Protection of Persons or Property. The clear and present danger test permits speech to be penalized when it is on the brink of erupting into violence against persons or property. 53 Once physical injury to persons or property has taken place, criminal and tort rules of general application may be brought to bear upon the wrongdoer, and it is no defense that the persons were injured or the property destroyed in the cause of free expression. There is no first amendment right to commit physical assault or damage another's property. Under the principles established in United States v. O'Brien, 54 when the government promulgates a rule for reasons unrelated to the content of 50. In Cohen, 403 US at 20, the Court "restated" the fighting words doctrine of Chaplinsky, superimposing upon it the requirements of a rigorous clear and present danger test. The Court in Cohen thus emphasized that in that case no one was present who would have regarded Paul Cohen's speech as a "direct personal insult," nor was there any danger of reactive violence against Cohen. I d.
51. In this sense the "fighting words doctrine" is not a discrete, free-standing doctrine at all, but merely a specific application of the general clear and present danger test.
It should be emphasized that the rigors of the clear and present danger test must be satisfied case by case. There was a time in our first amendment jurisprudence in which it was taken for granted that a legislature could effectively "precertify" certain identified classes of speech as satisfying the clear and present danger test. This was one of the principal themes in Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652 (1952), in which the Court approved proscription of utterances which, "by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State." Id at 669. You can't start a fire without a spark, and the Court was convinced that a "single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration." Id.
The Court in Gitlow did not require that foreseeable harm be demonstrated in each individual prosecution. Id at 670. Rather, the legislature could make a generic determination applicable to a broad class of speech, and thereby estop individuals from claiming that their particular speech posed no serious threats. Thus the Court admonished,
when the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and of itself, to bring about the substantive evil, is not open to consideration. In O'Brien, the Court upheld convictions for burning draft cards to protest the Vietnam War. The protesters argued that burning a draft card was a form of political protest, and that Congress had purposefully intended to censor freedom of speech in amending federal law to prohibit mutilation of the cards. Id at 376. The Supreme Court refused to scratch beneath the surface of Congress' intent and upheld the convictions. Id at 376-77. O'Brien's burning of his draft card, the Court reasoned, involved a mixture of "speech" and "conduct." Id at 376. [Vol. 53: No. 3 expression, and the governmental interests at stake are substantial, the regulation will normally be upheld even though it may have the incidental effect of interfering with speech.
A student who spray-paints a hate message on the side of a university building might thus be prosecuted for damage to the property. 55 If the university were to engage in selective prosecutions, however, punishing those who desecrate university property with hate speech but ignoring desecration Whenever "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same activity, the Court held, the government is permitted to regulate the activity if can meet a four-pronged test:
(1) the governmental regulation must be "within the constitutional power of the Government"; (2) the regulation must further an "important or substantial governmental interest"; (3) the governmental interest must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"; and (4) the "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms" must be "no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Id at 377 (citation omitted). The Court's application of this test in the O'Brien case itself was disingenuous-the only credible reading of Congress' intent was that it did wish to stifle dissent by banning mutilation of draft cards as a form of protest. But the basic conceptual point of 0 'Brien was sound and remains an integral part of modern first amendment jurisprudence. When governmental intent is truly "clean," and genuinely unrelated to the suppression of free expression, then a standard of judicial review less stringent than strict scrutiny is warranted for the incidental "spillover" effect that the law has on free speech.
55. The key here is the third prong of the 0 'Brien test; it is the "gatekeeper," so to speak, governing entrance to the lower standard in O'Brien. This prong is crucial; much of modem first amendment law turns upon how it is interpreted. Under prong three, the governmental interest used to justify the law must be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id at 384. What does this phrase mean? In fact, this phrase is susceptible to two different interpretations, and the level of protection for free speech in our society is largely bound up in which of those two meanings we choose.
The first possible interpretation of the phrase "unrelated to the suppression of free expression" is that government must have some reason other than a desire to censor speech as the rationale for its regulation. This seems straightforward enough. In the O'Brien case, the reason was the orderly administration of the selective service system. What could be simpler? The difficulty comes from this: all laws restricting freedom of speech are passed because of some "interest unrelated to free expression."
Governments pass laws restricting freedom of speech because they fear physical violence against persons or property, or because they are concerned about maintaining national security, or because they wish to shelter other citizens from attacks on their reputation, or invasion of their privacy, or insults to their human dignity, or because they wish to protect community morals, or promote tolerance, or encourage cohesiveness-governments pass laws restricting freedom of speech for all of these reasons and many more, and in every instance it is possible to characterize the governmental goal as "unrelated to free expression." No law abridging freedom of speech is ever promoted as a law abridging freedom of speech. The preambles to statutes never announce: "Whereas, there is a social interest in the suppression of free expression, be it enacted .... " Because legislatures that pass laws restricting speech always have, as their ultimate goal, some perceived social interest other than suppression of speech, there is no law that could not qualify for the lenient treatment of the 0 'Brien test if the phrase "an interest unrelated to free expression" refers merely to that ultimate goal. Such an interpretation of O'Brien would make defending the government nice work, for it would insure that the tough, clear and present danger and strict scrutiny tests would always be bypassed. We should thus label this first interpretation of the phrase the "heretical version" of 0 'Brien and be constantly vigilant against its use.
The sound interpretation of the phrase "unrelated to free expression" focuses not upon the ultimate goal of the legislation, but rather upon whether the justifications for the law advanced by the government have nothing to do with the communicative aspects of the conduct being regulated. When the dangers that allegedly flow from the activity have nothing to do with what is communicated, but only with what is done, the dangers are unrelated to free expression. But when the dangers the government seeks to prevent are dangers that it fears will arise because of what is communicated, with other messages, this discriminatory application of the facially neutral law, based on the content of the wrongdoer's message, would violate the Constitution. 56 4. Discriminatory Conduct. Just as the first amendment does not immunize physical attacks on persons or property, it does not immunize discriminatory conduct illegal under the equal protection clause, civil rights acts, or labor laws. Hate speech is often used as evidence of illegal discriminatory behavior. 57 As long as it is the underlying discriminatory behavior and not the speech that is being regulated, the first amendment is not offended. Under the analysis in O'Brien, the penalty exacted on speech in such cases is incidental to the governmental purpose of regulating the purely nonexpressive component of the conduct. 5 8 then the regulation is ''related to free expression," and should be subjected to the clear and present danger and strict scrutiny tests, and not to the 0 'Brien tesl.
This crucial distinction can be most easily illustrated by contrasting a "Hag-burning" law with a mere "burning" law. A mere burning law-an ordinance that forbids lighting open fires in a public park-is a law passed to vindicate interests genuinely unrelated lO free expression. The government might pass such a law because it believes open fires in the park present fire hazards that might cause injury to park land or patrons. The government might also pass such an ordinance as pan of a more general environmental policy, concerned with the serious air pollution effects of open fires in an urban environmenl. Such an antiburning ordinance could have the incidental effect of suppressing speech, for it would prevent persons from burning things to express themselves. (The language of the Court in O'Brien, it should be noted, spoke in precisely these terms, referring lO "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms." Id at 377 (emphasis added).) This incidental impact would be purely happenstance, however, for the law was passed lo prevent harms that have nothing whatever to do with the communicative aspect of burning a flag, draft card, effigy, or any other symbol, but rather to prevent the harms of burning, period.
When the government bans Hag-burning, by contrast, it does so to prevent harms that do arise from the communicative element of the acl. Laws against Hag-burning are not passed out of concern for pollution of the physical atmosphere but out of concern for pollution of the political atmosphere. The government does not like what burning the flag means. While it is true that government may have, as its ullimale goal, an altruistic concern with political cohesiveness, the justifications that it advances for banning Hag-burning are based on the supposition that what is communicated by flagburning will tend lO undermine that cohesiveness. This is the correct interpretation of O'Brien, and for the most pan the Supreme Court has been conscientious in adhering lo this interpretation. The Court has emphasized on several occasions, for example, that the lest of whether a law serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is whether it is "justified without reference lO the content of the regulated speech." Ward, 109 S Ct at 2754.
56. The constilUtional violation might be concepwalized in two ways. Discriminatory application of an otherwise neutral law on the basis of a suspect class (such as racial identity) or the exercise of a fundamental right (such as free speech) triggers "strict scrutiny" under the equal protection clause and is usually a constitutional violation. Yick Wo v Hopkins, 118 US 356, 373-74 ( 1886). Alternatively, the act of selective prosecution might simply be used as evidence that the ostensibly content-neutral governmental interest is a sham, and the real motivating force is punishment based on the content (and, indeed, viewpoint) of the speech. This showing should disqualify the government from use of the 0 'Brien test, and trigger strict scrutiny under the first amendmenl. Under the neutrality principle, such viewpoint-based discrimination is virtually a per se constitutional violation. See notes 24-26 and accompanying texl. 57. A racist remark by a public official, for example, might be used as proof of discriminatory intent in the administration of a governmental program in a suit alleging a violation of the equal protection clause. The racist statement could be the "smoking gun" that the disparate impact of the program was the resull of purposeful governmental discrimination. Similarly, racist speech might be used to demonstrate a violation of federal labor laws, see Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 12 (1962), or as proof of housing or employment discrimination in violation of civil rights acts.
58. See note 34 and accompanying texl.
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The Theory of Hate Speech as a Relational
Harm. The harm principle of modem first amendment jurisprudence forbids punishing speech on the ground that the message is intellectually or emotionally repugnant to a vast majority. 59 When the speech interferes with a "relational interest," however, it may be penalized. 60 Thus, a public figure who is ridiculed through a vicious caricature may not recover in tort merely for the emotional distress caused by the attack, but may recover for libel or invasion of privacy.
61
The difference between recovery for infliction of emotional distress alone and recovery for libel or invasion of privacy goes to the heart of the harm principle. Permitting recovery for unvarnished emotional distress cannot be reconciled with core first amendment principles-no matter how we dress it up, the tort rests at bottom on the individual distress caused by the message of the speech and on the sense of collective community outrage caused by the violation of accepted rules of civility. 62 These are precisely the types of harms that modem first amendment theory disqualifies as justifications for abridging speech. 63 The torts of libel and invasion of privacy, however, carry additional weight; they implicate harms over and above individual psychological disturbance or collective community outrage. Libel interferes with reputation, a concept that the common law long ago reified as an interest existing outside the individual persona, an intangible asset of social or professional life that may be inventoried like any other stock in trade. 64 Similarly, the four commonly accepted forms of invasion of privacy all implicate interests over and above mere infliction of emotional distress. . Both intrusion and publication of private facts implicate "invasions" of interests distinct from mere outrage at a speaker's message; they are forms, so to speak, of "psychic trespass." Indeed, the this constitutional divide is conceptually sound, where does hate speech fall in the taxonomy of harms? Is it more like libel and invasion of privacy, or more like intentional infliction of emotional distress? The question is close. Looking back at Beauharnais v. Illinois, 66 it is clear that Justice Frankfurter thought that hate speech was closely analogous to libel or invasion of privacy-and that the force of the analogy was not dissipated merely because the slur was aimed at an entire racial group.
Frankfurter observed that if a libelous utterance directed at an individual may be punished, "we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a willful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State." 67 Illinois, Frankfurter observed, did not have to look beyond its own borders "or await the tragic experience of the last three decades" (a reference to Nazi Germany) to conclude that purveyors of racial and religious hate "promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot community." 6 8 Recalling events from the 183 7 murder of the abolitionist Lovejoy to the 1951 riots in Cicero, Frankfurter concluded that Illinois might well deduce that racial tensions are exacerbated and more likely to flare into violence when racist messages are tolerated. 69 Frankfurter also argued that Illinois was entitled to conclude that the dignity of the individual might be inextricably intertwined with protection for the reputation of his racial or religious group. It was not for the Supreme Court, he said, to deny that the "Illinois legislature may warrantably believe that a man's job and his educational opportunities and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own merits. " 70 Frankfurter's treatment of group libel as an interference with a relational interest is not without appeal, 71 but current first amendment jurisprudence intrusion tort requires no speech at all-though it is often commiued as incident to gathering information.
The point here is not that these privacy torts raise no first amendment problems. The tort of publication of private facts raises such serious first amendment difficulties, for example, that its continuing existence is in genuine doubt. See Florida Star v B.j. F., I 09 S Ct 2603 ( 1989). The point, rather, is that if these privacy torts are to have at least a fighting chance of survival under the modern first amendment, they must be understood to protect individuals from interests other than mere outrage at the content of a speaker's message. The outrage may perhaps be part of the cause of action-as in the requirement of offensiveness that pervades privacy theory-but that offensiveness may not stand alone. Rather, it must be incident to the invasion of some other more palpable interest. To the extent that some of what would pass muster under the law of torts as an invasion of privacy will not pass muster under the first amendment, the first amendment lesson is that the privacy torts should have a structural integrity distinct from sheltering the victim from distress caused by the content of speech. If there is an Achilles' heel to modem first amendmentjurisprudence, it is the dichotomy between speech of "general public interest or concern" and "private" speech. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court has held that first amendment rules highly protective of freedom of speech do not apply with full force-and indeed, may not apply at all-when the speech is of purely private concem. 75 The public speech/private speech dichotomy is still in an early stage of evolution-the 72. See the textual discussion accompanying notes 75-80. 73. See notes 32-33 and accompanying texl. 74. The Supreme Court's most recent foray into the facl/opinion distinction in libel law further bolsters this assertion. In Milkovich, 110 S Ct at 2706, the Court declined to create a special constitutional doctrine immunizing "opinion" from defamation liability. See note 25. In a backhanded way, however, the Court's ruling did immunize all speech that is notfactual in nature from defamation liability. The Court thus construed its prior decision in Philadelphia Newspapers, 106 S Ct 1558, as standing "for the proposition that a statement on mallers of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law, at least in situations like the present, where a media defendant is involved." Milkovich, 110 S Ct at 2706. The Court similarly relied on its prior decision in Hustler, emphasizing that an action by a public figure was precluded under the first amendment in the absence of statements that could " 'reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved.' " Id at 2705, quoting Hustler, 485 US at 50. The Court also endorsed its prior decisions in Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass 'n v Bresler, 398 US 6 ( 1970) and Letter Carriers v Austin, 418 US 264 (1974), protecting "rhetorical hyperbole." Milkovich, 110 S Ct at 2704-05.
In Milkovich the Court thus tied first amendment requirements to the traditional common law doctrines defining what type of speech qualifies as "defamatory." Significantly, the common law excluded name-calling, insults, epithets, and verbal abuse from the definition of "defamatory." Smolla, Law of Defamation at § 4.03 (cited in note 5).
75. In Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 ( 1983), the Court dealt with the free speech of employees not relating to general discussion on mallers of public interest or concern, but on mallers of "insubordination" within the hierarchy of the agency. The case involved Harry Connick, the district allorney for Orleans Parish, Louisiana, and Sheila Myers, an assistant district allorney on Connick's staff. A dispute between Connick and Myers arose when Connick tried to transfer Myers to a different section of the criminal court. Myers prepared and distributed to the other assistants in the office a questionnaire concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, their level of confidence in superiors, and whether they felt pressure from their superiors to work in political campaigns. Connick fired Myers, declaring the questionnaire an act of "insubordination." Id at 141.
The Supreme Court upheld the termination. Justice White noted that for "most of this century, the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to object to conditions placed upon the terms of employment-including those which restricted the exercise of constitutional rights." Id at 143. After acknowledging the Holmes position and the persistence of the right-privilege distinction, however, Justice White explicitly rejected the distinction as a legitimate framework for analysis. Id at 14 7.
Yet Myers still lost her case. The Court introduced a dichotomy between speech on mallers of "public" concern and speech on mallers of "private" concern. "When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any maller of political, social, or other concern to the community, Court's few invocations of the distinction have done little to define it. 76 It is clear, however, that the phrase "general or public concern" is broad. Nothing in the public speech/private speech distinction, for example, rolls back the Court's expansive first amendment protection for speech on the wide range of cultural and social topics that are unrelated to politics or self-governance. 77 Similarly, speech may qualify as a matter of public interest even though it occurs in settings that are not part of the general arena of public discourse. 78 The confluence of first amendment doctrines that protect hate speech uttered or published during the course of discussion of issues of public concern, therefore, might not apply at all when the speech bears no plausible connection to such issues. Thus, a campus newspaper running a racist parody directed against a faculty member, or against an entire racial group, would be fully protected, even if the parody were as vulgar and mean-spirited as the caricature in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell. Issues concerning race are quintessentially matters of public concern. But a gratuitous racial epithet uttered to a passerby in a context devoid of any plausible patina of intellectual content might be a different matter entirely. 79 The brutal inarticulate speech of the heart, uttered outside of any discussion of public issues or affairs, might thus fall outside of the first amendment's protection entirely. 80 
D. Summary of Permissible Controls on Hate Speech
The exceptions to first amendment protection recognized under the negative side of free speech jurisprudence permit regulation of hate speech in government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id at 146.
Similarly, in Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v Green moss Builders, Inc., 4 72 US 749, 763 ( 1985), the Court held that its first amendment rules governing the types of damages recoverable in defamation suits did not apply to defamation actions not involving "matters of public concern." (The case arose out of an erroneous and damaging credit report. 483 US 378 (1987) , the Supreme Court had before it the issue of whether an employee in a Texas county constable's office could be fired for stating, upon hearing the news bulletin that someone had attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, "If they go for him again, I hope they get him." 1d at 380. Notwithstanding the employment setting, the Court held that this speech was clearly on an issue of "public concern," and held that the employee could not be fired. Id at 388.
79. This is language that requires no more thought than the ability to spell; language that states no fact, offers no opinion, proposes no transaction, attempts no persuasion; language that contains no humorous punch-line, no melodic rhythm, no color or shape or texture that might pass as art or entertainment; language that embodies emotion with no elaborative gloss other than feeble minimum intellectual current necessary to power the use of words. only a small number of closely confined circumstances. Sweeping prohibitions on hate speech, patterned on the group libel notions of Beauharnais, are unconstitutional. The only prohibitions likely to be upheld are narrowly drawn restrictions on fighting words that present a clear and present danger of violence, 81 or that punish physical injury to persons or property, 82 or illegal discriminatory conduct, 83 or that involve purely private speech in a context completely removed from discussion of issues of general or public concern.s 4
III

ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND HATE SPEECH ON CAMPUS
A. Introduction: The "Idea of a University"
The first amendment principles canvassed above permit only the most modest controls on hate speech. But should those rules apply with full force on university campuses? If the regime of Bei:mharnais v. Illinois has been effectively overruled in the general marketplace, might not university campuses be treated as special settings, walled off from the general marketplace, in which the principles of Beauharnais still reign supreme?
From the perspectives both of first amendment jurisprudence and of notions of academic freedom, resolution of the conflicts posed by hate speech inevitably turns on how society conceives the idea of a university. What is this idea? Randolph Bourne in 1917 spoke fondly of the "old, noble ideal of a community of scholarship." 85 There is an endearing image of the university as set off from the rest of society-not disconnected or irrelevant, but still somehow specially removed, an island of retreat for the life of the mind. The phrase "academic freedom" conjures up this image of insularity. Wrapped in the phrase are the many claims and intuitions that because the university is special-specially important and specially vulnerable-policies and rules binding on the rest of society should not always apply to it. Campuses today are under pressure from many quarters to compromise the noble idea of the university as an island of intellectual inquiry and robust discourse that ought to maintain some degree of separation from the commands of the sovereign, the tantalizing seductions of gigantic financial grants, and the whimsical ebbs ancl flows of mass politics and prejudice.
But if a university is an island, what kind of island is it? For many, its principal distinguishing characteristic is unfettered expressive freedom. The university is a libertarian island, the one place that embraces, heart and soul, John Stuart Mill's wide-open marketplace. For others, however, Bourne's phrase "a community of scholarship" seems more apt, with emphasis on the word "community." The university is an island of equality, civility, tolerance, and respect for human dignity; a place where the contemplative and rational faculties of man should tri4mph over blind passion and prejudice.
These two images live side by side on campus. Most faculty, students, and administrators are attracted to both ideas and are discomfited when they conflict. 86 
B. Universities and the Concept of Open Forums
The free speech status of a state college or university is governed by a branch of first amendment jurisprudence known as "public forum law." 87 The Supreme Court has recognized three distinct categories of public forums. The first, the traditional or quintessential public forum, consists of places such as streets or parks that "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 88 Content-based regulation of speech in a traditional public forum is governed by the strict scrutiny test: the regulation must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and must be narrowly drawn to achieve that end. 89 Content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech in a traditional public forum is permitted if it serves an "important," "significant," or "substantial" governmental interest, is narrowly tailored to achieve the interest, and leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. go The second category, the designated open public forum, consists of public property opened by the state for indiscriminate use as a place for expressive 86 . See notes 2-3. 87. In exploring the idea of a university, it is necessary to distinguish between matters of constitutional law and of academic policy. State institutions, bound by the Constitution, do not enjoy unfettered freedom to choose between the libertarian and communitarian models of university life. Their choices are constricted by first amendment public forum law, which in turn controls whether the constitutional principles of the general marketplace will or will not be activated on the campus. For private universities, identical choices exist-but they are choices of policy, not constitutional law. This article examines the constitutional public forum law applicable to state universities. The constitutional law conclusions drawn herein, however, are also intended to apply fully to private universities--even though private universities are not legally bound to accept them. That, admittedly, is itself an enormously fertile ground for debate: should private universities conduct themselves as if they are bound by the first amendment? (The issue, of course, is not unique to the topic of hate speech.) The assumption made in this article is that the noble idea of a university explored here recognizes no distinction between state and private institutions, because it behooves any university that aspires to greatness to organize itself according to principles of freedom of speech that are at least as protective as those of the Constitution. But obviously, it is for private universities to ask themselves whether they feel it is appropriate to truly take the first amendment to heart. Space does not permit a full treatment of this issue in this article.
88. activity. If the government intentionally dedicates a piece of public property to the public at large for assembly and speech, then it will be bound by the same standards applicable to a traditional public forum. Content-based regulation of speech in a designated open public forum must thus satisfy the strict scrutiny test.
91 A state is "not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility," 92 but as long as it does so, the strict scrutiny test applies. 93 The third category, the nonpublic forum, consists of publicly owned facilities that have been dedicated to use for either noncommunicative or communicative purposes, but have never been designated for indiscriminate expressive activity by the general public. " [T] he First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government. " 94 The content-based regulation of speech in a nonpublic forum is not governed by the strict scrutiny test, but by a "reasonable nexus" standard. The government "may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." 95 Entire classes of speech thus may be excluded from a nonpublic forum. Those classes may be identified by content, as long as the exclusion is reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and there is no discrimination among viewpoints within a class. "Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. " 96 How should a state university campus be classified for first amendment purposes? The soundest view is to treat the campus not as one unified forum, but as subdivided into multiple forums to which differing free speech standards apply. On the grounds of every state university campus, for example, are located traditional public forums, which serve as the functional equivalent in campus life of the Boston Common, the Washington Mall, or the streets and sidewalks in front of the seat of government. Of course, the geography of campuses differs-at some universities, this traditional forum may be the open campus green or plaza, at others it may be the entrance to the student union or the main classroom building. But every state campus, like every city, should be understood to have at least one location 98 involving the University of Missouri at Kansas City. The university's stated policy was to encourage. the activities of student organizations, and it officially recognized over 100 student groups. 99 The university regularly provided facilities for the meetings of registered organizations; students paid an activity fee to help defray the costs to the university. 10° From 1973 until 1977, a registered religious group named Cornerstone, an organization of evangelical Christian students from various denominational backgrounds, 101 regularly sought and received permission to conduct its meetings in university facilities. 102 In 1977, however, the university informed the group that it could no longer meet in the university's buildings.t 03 The exclusion was based on a regulation, adopted in 1972 by the university, forbidding the use of university facilities "for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."
104
The university defended its regulation on the grounds that the prohibition was necessary to avoid a violation of the establishment clause of the first amendment. 105 The Supreme Court rejected this defense and held the Missouri restnctiOn unconstitutional.
106 The Court reasoned that permitting a student religious group to use the university's facilities on the same terms as other student groups could not be construed as an implicit endorsement of the religious group's message, and that therefore the establishment clause was not violated by letting the religious group in. 107 The University had designated its facilities as open forums, the Court held, and consequently could not discriminate against religious speech. 108 "The Constitution forbids a State to 97 . This requirement is analogous to so-called "green space" restrictions common in modern land use and environmental regulation. In order to preserve the environmental quality of life in every area developed for residential or business use, green space regulations require developers to maintain a specified ratio of developed spaces to open, or green, spaces. We might think of the general marketplace of speech as the green spaces of discourse. Governments own a substantial amount of the space on which this discourse occurs-public parks, streets, sidewalks, plazas, stadiums, auditoriums, and so on. It is essential that, in any given community, sufficient open physical space be dedicated to the general marketplace. For unless we think of these spaces as subject to a perpetual public "easement" for free speech, government could dramatically curtail much of the speech most vital to the general marketplace, such as mass protest demonstrations. What does Widmar really mean? Does it require universities to permit all forms of hate speech on campus that must be tolerated in the general marketplace? Widmar might be understood as standing for the proposition that, by virtue of the large quantity of diverse speech customarily permitted on state campuses, they are in all respects designated open public forums. That view, however, reads more into Widmar than it will legitimately bear, since there was never really any contest concerning the open forum status of the particular university facilities at issue in Widmar. 110 The Widmar decision does not stand for the proposition that a state university is compelled by the first amendment to treat all places at all times as open public forums. As support for this assertion, consider the following problem. Justice White argued in dissent in Widmar that the university should be permitted to exclude religious worship and services from its facilities, even if it were required by the first amendment to permit access to other forms of religious speech.
111
Thus the university would have to permit a Catholic student group access to its classrooms for a meeting, but not permit access for the celebration of Mass. A majority of the Court, however, rejected Justice White's argument, refusing to accept any distinction between religious worship and other forms of religious speech in an open forum. Now imagine that a professor at the University of Missouri wishes to open his history of religion class, which is conducted in the same classroom in which the student religious group regularly meets by instructing the students to bow their heads and join him in reciting the Lord's Prayer. Surely this instruction would violate the establishment clause. The act of a university official leading a captive group of students in a prayer is totally distinct from a group of students meeting voluntarily on their own to pray. The professor could not successfully defend his actions by asserting that the classroom is an open forum under Widmar and that, under first amendment principles or principles of academic freedom, he has a right to lead his students in prayer to commence his class. The constitutional calculus changes as the function of 109. ld at 267-68. II 0. There was no contest in Widmar over the open public forum status of the classroom facilities (outside of normal class usage) on the University of Missouri's Kansas City campus. The university did not defend its position on the basis that it had created only a nonpublic forum for these facilities, nor did it attempt to avoid application of the strict scrutiny test. Rather, the university argued that its interest in maintaining strict separation of church and state created a compelling state interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny review. The Supreme Court in Widmar therefore accepted as a given that the facilities at issue on the Missouri campus were open public forums, and it constantly emphasized the breadth of those forums. The Court referred to the Missouri campus as "a forum generally open to the public," id at 268, "a public forum," id at 270, a "public forum, open to all forms of discourse," id at 273, an "open forum," id at 274, and "a forum generally open to student groups." Id at 277. The Court noted that "the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student groups at UMKC." Id at 274.
Ill. Id at 282-89 (White dissenting).
the classroom changes.
112 Principles of academic freedom may well give him a large measure of freedom to choose how he will present the history of religion in that classroom, but that freedom does not extend to actually conducting religious worship or services. The very distinction between religious speech and religious worship advanced by Justice White but rejected by a majority of the Court in the context of the university's open forum would be valid and controlling during actual class times.
An analogous process applies to hate speech. There are settings on the campus in which the rule of Beauharnais, and not the rule of Brandenburg, should apply.
113 When considered against the backdrop of the complexities of academic freedom, this distinction is most vividly demonstrated by examining the power of a university to discipline its own employees, including its administrators and faculty, for hate speech that would normally be protected by the first amendment.
114
Principles of free speech and academic freedom should certainly be understood to give faculty a large measure of independence in how they present materials in class on matters relating to race, sex, or sexual orientation. Viewpoint discrimination should not be permitted, even when the university regards the view espoused by the professor as repugnant. Thus a professor should have the right to espouse bona fide academic opinions concerning racial characteristics or capabilities, even though most people of good will and good sense on the campus would find the opinions loathsome. Academic freedom should be understood as making the professor an intellectual free agent, but not a behavioral free agent. The members of the faculty act as the representatives of the university in the classroom both on matters intellectual and on matters not plausibly related to intellectual positions. The university is under a constitutional obligation to refrain from stigmatizing hate speech and may likewise require the faculty, as its representatives, to refrain from stigmatizing hate speech in the classroom. 115 Just as a university is required to prevent its faculty from leading students in prayer to begin class sessions-even though that prayer would be constitutionally protected in other contexts-so too the university should be understood as at least permitted (and arguably required) to police gratuitous hate speech by faculty in classroom settings. It should be emphasized that this notion that a university has greater power to control hate speech by faculty or administrators in settings such as classrooms is not a mechanical invocation of the right-privilege distinction, which has been thoroughly discredited in modern constitutional law. 116 Under this distinction, which once dominated American constitutional law, government could attach whatever conditions it pleased to the receipt of governmental largess, including the surrender of constitutional rights that the recipient would otherwise eftioy. Thus, a faculty member could be told by the university, "You are free to exercise your freedom of speech to engage in constitutionally protected hate speech to your heart's content, but if you accept a university appointment here, you do so on the condition that you refrain from exercising that right." The faculty member may have a constitutional right to freedom of speech, but no constitutional right to be a faculty member. 117 Though the distinction has been discredited, the underlying "beggars can't be chosers" premise of the distinction has stamina, and it continues to surface-sometimes in disguise-115. Stigma is at the heart of modern equal protection analysis. In Brown v Board of Educ, 34 7 US 483, 494 ( 1954), the Court stated that to separate black children from white children solely because of their race "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." As Professor Charles Lawrence explains, Brown held that separate was inherently unequal "because of the message that segregation conveys-the message that black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white children." Lawrence, 1990 Duke LJ at 439 (cited in note 2) (emphasis in the original). In Anderson v Martin. 375 US 399 (1964), the Court struck down a state law that required designation of the race of candidates on ballots. The Court reasoned that while no one doubts that voters in the privacy of the voting booth may take racial identity into account in casting their votes, the government may not encourage that accounting by placing the race of the candidate on the ballot. Id at 402. The specification of a candidate's race is different in kind from the designation of a candidate as "Republican" or "Democrat." Id at 402-03. To identify candidates by race, the Court held, places "the power of the State behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls." Id at 402. Justice Brennan in Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265 ( 1978), pronounced as a "cardinal principle" the proposition that "racial classifications that stigmatize-because they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism-are invalid without more." Id at 357-58 (Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. in modern cases. 118 But at least in first amendment cases, the Supreme Court consistently refuses to accept the distinction.' 1 9 Thus, in controlling the speech of faculty or administrators, the university is emphatically not permitted to rely merely on the leverage of employment, but must justify its regulation of speech according to whatever first amendment principles would otherwise apply.
The principle just stated, however, does not mean that the status of employment is constitutionally irrelevant to the first amendment analysis. The particular circumstances of the employment context may supply the government with justifications for regulating speech that would not exist otherwise. Rather than invoking the right-privilege distinction, the government simply would apply general first amendment principles to the specific facts of a case. When a governmental employee speaks in part for the government, the situation implicates a governmental interest in controlling the content of its own speech and ensuring that it is not, for example, racially or sexually abusive; 120 the presence of this interest therefore creates a justified opportunity for regulation.
The hate speech of students on campus is more problematic. If the setting were high school or elementary school, the role of the school as an inculcator of civic values would permit Beauhamais-style controls on the hate speech of students.' 21 But college students are adults. Does the idea of a university contemplate a role for the institution as an inculcator of what might be called academic values, as opposed to academic freedom? Might not the university say that part of its legitimate mission is to teach students how to contend vigorously within the marketplace of ideas while nevertheless observing [V, ol. 53: No. 3 certain norms of civility? 122 Might not the university claim that part of its mission is to encourage the triumph of the rational and contemplative sides of the intellect over passion and prejudice? 123 The answer to these questions is bound up in yet one final aspect of the idea of a university-namely, how universities teach.
IV CONCLUSION
Let there be no doubt that hate speech on campus should be fought with all the vigor a university can muster. Hate speech is an abomination, a rape of human dignity. And let there be no inhibition in punishing hate speech in any of the contexts in which speech may be punished under recognized first amendment doctrines-as when it poses a clear and present danger of violence, 124 or when it is intertwined with actual discriminatory conduct. 125 But outside those narrowly defined first amendment categories, the battle against hate speech will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion. The conflict felt by most administrators, faculty, and students of good will on most American campuses is that we hate hate speech as much as we love free speech. The conflict, however, is not irreconcilable. It is most constructively resolved by a staunch commitment to free expression principles, supplemented with an equally vigorous attack on hate speech in all its forms, emphasizing energetic leadership and education on the academic values of tolerance, civility, and respect for human dignity, rather than punitive and coercive measures. 126 In this respect both of the grand ideas of a university are vindicated. The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace.
